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Abstract Pay for performance (P4P) is increasingly being
used to stimulate healthcare providers to improve their
performance. However, evidence on P4P effectiveness
remains inconclusive. Flaws in program design may have
contributed to this limited success. Based on a synthesis of
relevant theoretical and empirical literature, this paper dis-
cusses key issues in P4P-program design. The analysis
reveals that designing a fair and effective program is a
complex undertaking. The following tentative conclusions
are made: (1) performance is ideally defined broadly, pro-
vided that the set of measures remains comprehensible, (2)
concerns that P4P encourages ‘‘selection’’ and ‘‘teaching to
the test’’ should not be dismissed, (3) sophisticated risk
adjustment is important, especially in outcome and resource
use measures, (4) involving providers in program design is
vital, (5) on balance, group incentives are preferred over
individual incentives, (6) whether to use rewards or penalties
is context-dependent, (7) payouts should be frequent and
low-powered, (8) absolute targets are generally preferred
over relative targets, (9) multiple targets are preferred over
single targets, and (10) P4P should be a permanent compo-
nent of provider compensation and is ideally ‘‘decoupled’’
form base payments. However, the design of P4P programs
should be tailored to the specific setting of implementation,
and empirical research is needed to confirm the conclusions.
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Introduction
In many countries, healthcare delivery is suboptimal. For
example, McGlynn et al. [70] have shown that in the
United States (US) adherence to recommended care pro-
cesses is near 50 percent. In the Netherlands, this is about
67 percent, but there is large variation among providers
and among specific guidelines [45]. Similar deficits were
found in the United Kingdom (UK), Australia, and New
Zealand [91]. As a response, a multitude of strategies has
been developed to spur improvements in performance.
Pay for performance (P4P) is one of these strategies. In
P4P, healthcare providers receive explicit financial
incentives for reaching targets on predefined performance
measures. The premise of P4P is that providers are
responsive to financial incentives ([26, 41, 42, 51, 97])
and that each of the commonest payment methods (i.e.,
fee-for-service, capitation, and salary) is not designed to
stimulate good performance and separately creates
incentives for undesired behavior. Given that performance
measurements have become more accurate over the past
two decades, it therefore seems appropriate to use finan-
cial incentives explicitly to stimulate improvements in
performance. The main goal of P4P is to improve patient
outcomes while mitigating unintended consequences (such
as increasing disparities). By contributing to better pre-
vention and disease management, as well as by including
efficiency measures, if effective, P4P could also mitigate
cost growth.
P4P is now widely being applied in the United States
and the United Kingdom [4, 85, 89] and increasingly being
implemented in many other countries [5, 7, 24, 46, 66, 84].
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However, in contrast to what its popularity in practice
suggests, P4P effectiveness has not been convincingly
confirmed. A broad evidence base is lacking, and existing
studies show mixed or inconclusive results [13, 17, 78, 87].
Moreover, unintended and undesired effects of P4P have
been demonstrated [9, 10, 34, 62, 68, 92, 99]. Nonetheless,
in general, the potential of P4P to improve performance
remains undisputed. There is consensus that the way in
which P4P is designed has important consequences for the
incentives that physicians experience and how they might
respond to them [71]. As argued by several authors, the fact
that P4P has not been very successful has partly been a
consequence of flaws in program design [68, 78, 86, 87].
Although the idea underlying P4P is simple, designing a
fair and effective program is a complex undertaking
involving many different aspects to consider.
The goal of this paper is to provide an overview of key
issues in the design of P4P programs. Other authors have
already provided important contributions in this area [16,
17, 71, 86, 97, 102]. However, this work typically
addresses a selection of design elements, without discuss-
ing other potentially relevant aspects in detail. This paper
synthesizes relevant theoretical and empirical literature as
well as findings from the previous work into a single
comprehensive overview. The first section discusses issues
regarding the definition of performance and important
prerequisites for preventing undesired behavior (‘‘what to
incentivize’’). The next section deals with the question
whether P4P should focus on individual providers or
groups of providers (‘‘whom to incentivize’’). Finally,
section three discusses consecutively whether programs
should use penalties or rewards, the size of the incentive
and the role of the base reimbursement system, whether the
program should pay for absolute or relative performance,
the frequency of payments, and the duration of P4P
incentives (‘‘how to incentivize’’). Throughout the paper,
issues regarding incentive salience and provider participa-
tion are also discussed. The salience of the financial
incentives incorporated in a P4P program is an important
predictor of the program’s effect on behavior. If providers
are aware of the program and the targets to be attained, and
actually experience the incentives in daily practice,
behavioral response is likely. Likewise, the willingness of
providers to participate and their possibilities of ‘‘exit’’
determine to a great extent the success of the program.
What to incentivize: how is performance defined?
Dimensions and measurement of performance
Depending on the goals of the stakeholders involved,
programs will vary in how ‘‘good performance’’ is defined
[59]. Cost and utilization control were the main focus of
early P4P programs in the United States (e.g., [74]), mainly
because of the context in which they were implemented
(pay-for-volume was the status quo), but also because
measurement is relatively straightforward and the means
by which savings were achieved (e.g., more prevention,
less overtreatment) was also expected to be beneficial for
the quality of care. More recently, however, payers and
purchasers have increasingly been using P4P to spur
improvements in the quality of care. Quality is a multidi-
mensional concept embodied in structures (e.g., having an
up-to-date registration system for diabetics), processes
(e.g., regularly performing blood sugar checks on diabet-
ics), and (intermediate) outcomes (e.g., optimal blood
sugar levels in diabetics) [19]. Although structures and
processes are imperfect surrogates for outcomes, they are
used frequently in P4P programs because of the difficulty
of measuring and risk-adjusting outcomes [26]. A related
performance aspect is patient satisfaction or patient cen-
teredness, which, although clearly associated with quality
of care, is not necessarily positively correlated with desired
clinical processes and outcomes [100].
The number and characteristics of included performance
measures are likely to affect the eventual effect of the
program on overall performance [97]. If a program only
includes one or a few measures pertaining to one specific
performance aspect (e.g., diabetes care), this could result in
a disproportionate focus on a specific behavior (i.e.,
improving care for diabetics). If, on the other hand, many
different measures pertaining to many performance
dimensions and aspects are included, the program may be
too complex and providers may have difficulties in pro-
cessing the incentives. Consequently, providers may not
exhibit the desired behavior the purchaser wishes to stim-
ulate [97]. Thus, a balance is needed between ‘‘narrow and
shallow’’ and ‘‘broad and deep.’’ It also seems important to
combine objective measures (e.g., adherence to clinical
guidelines) with subjective measures such as patient sat-
isfaction and continuity of care [38]. Ultimately, the exact
definition of ‘‘good performance’’ depends on the context
in which the program is implemented.
In practice, measure sets are typically quite narrow,
which mainly is a result of strict inclusion criteria such as
consistency with other quality improvement activities, a
firm evidence base, good psychometric properties, and
availability of data at acceptable cost [4, 17, 88, 93]. To
minimize the burden and cost of data collection, many
programs largely rely on claims data, which are easy and
inexpensive to collect. However, claims data are not
intended and often not suitable for generating performance
information. To complement claims data, purchasers may
require providers to provide additional performance infor-
mation based on extractions of medical records and by
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administering patient satisfaction surveys. However,
extracting data from medical records is often time con-
suming and expensive. Also, it imposes substantially
higher burdens on smaller practices than on larger ones,
and increased reimbursement to support record reviews
may be necessary [65]. Information technology (IT) such
as electronic medical records (EMR) may considerably
reduce the cost and burden of data collection. Under the
Quality and Outcomes Framework (QOF), a large national
P4P program in the United Kingdom, primary care prac-
tices receive substantial financial rewards for scoring well
on a large number of performance measures [85]. For each
practice, performance information is extracted automati-
cally via a uniform system of EMRs. This has several
advantages, including complete and accurate data and
improved possibilities for performing checks on self-
reported data. In addition, because practices have ongoing
insight into their performance and receive relative perfor-
mance feedback, the system contributes to incentive
strength. However, such a comprehensive IT infrastructure
involves substantial investments. In the United Kingdom,
primary care practices were largely compensated for health
IT [22], but in other settings, this may not always be fea-
sible and providers may have to share in the costs. An
option is to make the financial incentives conditional on IT
adoption, which is increasingly being done in many P4P
programs. In the United States, EMRs are increasingly used
for the purpose of data collection, although still on a rel-
atively small scale [17, 65, 93].
Risk adjustment
Patients are not randomly distributed across providers, and
there is no level playing field regarding the attainability of
performance targets. Consequently, providers who perform
above average may be classified as average or even below
average, whereas providers who perform below average
may be classified as average or even above average, purely
as a result of differences in case mix. This provides a
strong incentive for providers to select healthy and com-
pliant patients and to avoid severely ill and noncompliant
patients. Adequate risk adjustment reduces this perverse
incentive (in this paper, ‘‘risk’’ refers to patient character-
istics that directly or indirectly affect providers’ perfor-
mance but cannot be influenced by providers, including
demographic characteristics, socioeconomic status, and
severity of disease). In general, outcome measures require
more sophisticated risk adjustment than process measures
because the latter are more within providers’ control. It is
therefore not surprising that structural and process mea-
sures are used much more often in current P4P programs
than outcome measures. Indeed, in addition to a lack of
routinely available clinical data, the limited use of outcome
measures in practice stems from concerns among pur-
chasers about the adequacy of risk-adjustment models [17].
Over the years, risk adjustment has become more sophis-
ticated. As a result, it is increasingly being applied in P4P
programs, and its importance is widely underscored [17,
88, 93].
Because risk adjustment contributes to a fair allocation
of performance payments, it may increase provider support
and participation. However, as noted by Christianson et al.
[12], ‘‘application of risk-adjustment techniques is often
controversial. They can be difficult to explain and require
sophisticated statistical methods to implement, which can
cause [providers] to view them as arbitrary ‘black boxes’
and to be suspicious of their validity.’’ Although trans-
parent application and communication can mitigate these
problems, even sophisticated risk-adjustment models may
be insufficient to effectively remove incentives for selec-
tion [54]. In addition, because of the complexity of patient
care, providers are likely to have better information about
their patients than the most detailed database and may
therefore still be able to improve their performance through
selection [23]. Moreover, even if information on outcome
quality can be routinely collected and risk adjustment
would be adequate, these measures will often not be useful
for P4P purposes because of low reliability as a result of
small sample size [63, 76]. In addition to clinical outcomes,
this will often also hold for measures of utilization and
resource use [54, 63, 73, 76].
Therefore, one should be cautious with including out-
come and resource use measures in P4P programs. They
should only be considered for inclusion if risk adjustment
is sophisticated and if sample size is large enough to yield
sufficient reliability. Yet, other strategies may still be
necessary to minimize incentives for selection. In the
United Kingdom, for example, performance measures
(including outcomes) in the QOF are not risk adjusted.
Instead, for each measure, practices are allowed to exclude
patients (e.g., those who are noncompliant) from the
measurements. While this provides practices with a tool to
increase income by excluding ‘‘difficult’’ patients or
patients for whom targets had been missed rather than
because of an appropriate reason, there is little evidence of
inappropriate use of ‘‘exception reporting’’ [20, 43],
although more research is needed to confirm this. Extensive
inspections and severe penalties for fraud may have con-
tributed to preventing this behavior.
Risk selection is not just a theoretical concept. Hofer
et al. [54] showed empirically that the easiest way for
physicians being profiled on the blood sugar levels of their
diabetic patients to have a substantial improvement in
performance would be to deselect from their panel those
patients with high blood sugar levels in the previous year.
They demonstrate that if physicians with the worst
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performance in year t-1 manage to deselect the one to three
patients with the highest blood sugar levels, they would in
most cases achieve substantially improved performance
than average in year t. In their analysis, about half of this
improvement was due to patient selection. Shen [92]
investigated whether a performance-based contracting
system for nonprofit providers of substance abuse treatment
resulted in providers selecting less severely ill clients in
their treatment program in order to improve their perfor-
mance. The data showed that after implementation of
performance-based contracting, the proportion most severe
patients increased in the control group whereas in the
intervention group this proportion decreased, providing a
clear indication that providers engaged in selection.
Another study showed that public reporting of hospital- and
surgeon-specific risk-adjusted mortality of coronary artery
bypass grafting (CABG) patients led to substantial selec-
tion by providers [23]: relative to patients in states without
such public reporting, a significant decline in the severity
of illness of CABG patients was observed in the two
intervention states. McDonald and Roland [68], comparing
unintended consequences of large P4P programs in Cali-
fornia and England, found that the inability of Californian
physicians to exclude individual patients from performance
calculations caused frustration and led some physicians to
deter noncompliant patients. Finally, in Taiwan, a national
P4P program for diabetes includes two unadjusted outcome
measures. Because providers are free to choose which
patients to enroll in the program, they both have an
incentive and a clear tool for selection. Indeed, older
patients and patients with greater disease severity or
comorbidity were more likely to be excluded from the
program than younger patients and patients with less dis-
ease severity or comorbidity [10].
Teaching to the test
As a result of explicitly targeting specific aspects of care,
P4P incentives may cause providers to focus dispropor-
tionately on those aspects of care that are measured and
incentivized, possibly to the detriment of other, often more
indeterminate aspects that are not (easily) measured [38,
55]. In the literature, this is known as teaching to the test,
which may occur especially in multitasking environments
(such as medical care). However, it is also possible that
rewarding specific behaviors leads to positive spillover
effects on unincentivized aspects of performance. As noted
by Mullen et al. [75], ‘‘which response dominates will
depend on the technology of quality improvement in
medical practices, about which little is known. For exam-
ple, screening and follow-up measures, such as mammog-
raphy and hemoglobin A1c (blood sugar) testing for
diabetics, may both be increased by a general improvement
in information technology, such as a computerized remin-
der program, despite differences in administration tech-
nique and patient populations.’’ In an empirical analysis of
performance data of physician medical groups contracting
with a large network HMO, Mullen et al. [75] did not find
evidence of positive or negative spillovers on unincentiv-
ized aspects of care, although some rewarded performance
measures improved. Another US study [39] found that
among hospitals participating in a quality-improvement
program, P4P had limited incremental impact on quality of
care for acute myocardial infarction. In addition, no evi-
dence was found that P4P had an adverse impact on
improvement in processes of care for which there were no
financial incentives. Two other studies have addressed
teaching to the test with respect to the QOF in the United
Kingdom, with more than 130 measures in about thirty
different areas the most comprehensive P4P program in the
world. Steel et al. [94] found neither improvement nor
deterioration in unincentivized conditions. However,
Campbell et al. [9] found a positive spillover effect on
unincentivized aspects of an included condition, a deteri-
oration of unincentivized aspects of two other included
conditions (while incentivized aspects continued to
improve), and a reduction in the continuity of care imme-
diately after the QOF was implemented. Most current P4P
programs include less performance domains and much
smaller sets of measures per domain than the QOF. In the
United States, while purchasers underscore the importance
of a broad set of measures, sets are typically narrow [4, 88].
However, the somewhat stronger evidence of teaching to
the test in the United Kingdom may also have been a result
of the magnitude of rewards, which can be up to 30 percent
of practice income. Rewards of this size may have
‘‘crowded out’’ practices’ intrinsic motivation, hence
leading to negative spillover effects on unrewarded per-
formance aspects (see below).
Although evidence of teaching to the test is limited,
theory and practice suggests that the risk cannot be ignored
and that unincentivized aspects should be monitored. As
Mullen et al. [75] argue, ‘‘even though we fail to find
conclusive evidence of negative spillovers (…), the con-
cern that P4P encourages ‘teaching to the test’ should not
be dismissed. Given the complex and largely unobservable
nature of healthcare quality, we can only study some
potential unintended consequences but we cannot confirm
or reject the existence of all such effects (…). The negative
incentives of P4P programs still exist and should be taken
seriously given evidence that providers do indeed respond
to incentives.’’ Negative spillovers can be mitigated by
adopting a varied set of performance measures. This also
contributes to incentive salience because the fraction of
providers’ patients to which the incentive applies is large.
The set should at least incorporate ‘‘high-impact’’
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measures, i.e., measures pertaining to conditions with a
high prevalence and/or disease burden. However, espe-
cially with respect to clinical quality, lack of data often
hampers inclusion of important performance measures.
Therefore, if P4P is to contribute to improved patient
outcomes, efforts should continue to focus on creating
reliable and easy to apply methods for extraction and val-
idation of patient-level data, and the merits of information
technology for these purposes should be explored further.
As noted, however, one should be cautious that the pro-
gram does not become too complex because individuals
often have difficulties in processing complex decisions that
are tied to financial incentives [71]. Yet, in P4P it is par-
ticularly important to carefully monitor the more indeter-
minate aspects such as continuity of care and patient
centredness (both core features of good patient care)
because these aspects will be among the first aspects that
may be neglected when the extrinsic motivation of pro-
viders is emphasized [67]. However, adequate measure-
ment of these aspects is often more difficult and more
expensive than measurement of e.g., clinical processes or
resource use. Consequently, even monitoring may be not
feasible. It is important, therefore, that providers are
actively involved in measure selection and program design.
Providers’ intrinsic motivation
Financial incentives based on productivity and financial
results may have a negative impact on physician satisfac-
tion whereas incentives based on quality and patient sat-
isfaction may positively affect physician satisfaction [48].
A possible reason may be that the former goals are less
aligned with physicians’ professional norms and values and
are therefore less acceptable to them [25]. Such dissatis-
faction mitigates the likelihood of a desired response and
increases the likelihood of undesired behavior because the
incentives may ‘‘crowd out’’ providers’ intrinsic motivation
to provide high-quality care. Research has shown that
extrinsic incentives may indeed result in outcrowding [18].
Although this literature primarily pertains to educational
settings, the idea seems to apply particularly well to phy-
sicians who are believed to be driven for a large part by
professionalism and have been socialized to put the interest
of their patients above anything else [32]. The introduction
of P4P could then play a trivializing role regarding the
nonfinancial motivation [6, 13]. However, this is also true
for the base payment system. Moreover, outcrowding will
be more significant as a result of base payments than of
P4P because it involves larger sums of money. P4P aims to
correct perverse incentives emanating from base payments
and in order to make sure that these are not exacerbated,
insight into how outcrowding occurs is required. According
to Marshall and Harrison [67], outcrowding may occur in
two ways: ‘‘firstly, external incentives may impair self-
determination, resulting in a shift in the locus of control
and the resulting loss of professional autonomy. Secondly,
external drivers may damage self-esteem, resulting in the
perception that professionalism is no longer valued.’’ In
addition, when extrinsic incentives are provided for per-
forming a particular task, individuals tend to view that task
as irksome or hard to perform [31]. Outcrowding is more
likely to occur in creative tasks, in overly bureaucratic
schemes, and in the more indeterminate aspects of pro-
fessional practice [67]. To prevent outcrowding, purchasers
should make sure that the incentives are viewed as legiti-
mating and reinforcing of internal motivators [15, 33]. If
the incentives are aligned with providers’ internal value
framework, the likelihood that the program will be suc-
cessful increases [67]. Alignment may be achieved by
focusing on the more technical aspects of performance and
by closely involving providers in program design and in
developing, selecting, and validating the performance
measures for which they will be held accountable [102].
All else equal, P4P may then compensate the loss in
intrinsic motivation that occurs as a result of base pay-
ments. Outcrowding can also be mitigated by making
participation voluntary. Even when providers are actively
involved in the development process, imposed participation
may be perceived as a loss of autonomy, which in turn may
lead to undesired behavior. However, if participation is
selective, performance differences among providers may
be created, sustained, and/or enlarged, which may lead to
and/or increase inequalities in access to high-quality care.
Clearly communicating to providers the program’s char-
acteristics and potential merits and actively involving
providers in program development mitigates this problem.
But even if a high participation rate can be attained,
reaching consensus will often be a long and difficult pro-
cess and inevitably involves making compromises, which
may result in diverging definitions of performance. It is
therefore important that the program is designed such that
it stimulates desired behavior and that agents (i.e., the
healthcare providers) are incentivized to act in the interests
of the principal (i.e., the purchaser).
In sum, performance is ideally defined broadly, provided
that the set of performance measures remains comprehen-
sible for providers. The set should at least incorporate
‘‘high-impact’’ measures of different performance dimen-
sions, and the more indeterminate aspects should be
monitored. However, measures should conform to strict
criteria before they can be used in P4P programs, including
good psychometric properties and availability of complete
and accurate data. Outcome and resource use measures
should only be included if risk adjustment is sophisticated
and if sample size is large enough. However, even then
providers may have incentives for selection, necessitating
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other risk-mitigating measures. To prevent undesired
behavior, it is vital that providers are actively involved in
program design, though monitoring for undesired conse-
quences and structured feedback to providers about such
consequences occurring will likely remain necessary.
Whom to incentivize: individuals or groups?
For performance issues that can be improved most effi-
ciently through group effort (e.g., those that require col-
lective action), incentives should be directed toward the
group level. For the extent to which issues are under
individual physicians’ control, incentives may be most
effective when targeted at individuals [37, 86, 97]. How-
ever, health care is increasingly provided in settings in
which professionals from diverging medical disciplines
cooperate in the treatment of patients. Consequently, it is
becoming increasingly difficult to ascribe a ‘‘good perfor-
mance’’ to an individual practitioner. Therefore, often it
would be logical to target P4P at groups of physicians
rather than individual physicians. (In this paper, we follow
Town et al.’s [97] definition of a medical group, i.e., an
actor in which two or more physicians operate as a part-
nership, have a common profit center, pool income, pay
expenses, and distribute profits to group members, rather
than an arrangement in which physicians retain their own
income and contribute to common office expenses). In
group incentives, in which the financial risk is shared
among the physicians in the group, performance is affected
through an effect on group culture, selection and sociali-
zation of new members, sharing of information, peer
pressure, and collaboration [97]. They may be more
effective than individual incentives because inefficiencies
in health care are often viewed to be a result of a failure of
systems [29, 58] and because of enabling factors like
assistance of other professional and support staff [102],
collaboration, peer review, and available infrastructure.
However, it is important to assess whether and how
incentives are passed along to group members [35]. When
such mechanisms are not (effectively) in place, the effect
of the program may be mitigated because the incentive to
improve performance experienced by individual group
members is weak [3, 36]. Free riding on the efforts of peers
may then be difficult to detect and penalize. As noted by
Town and colleagues [97], problems of free riding will
increase as group size increases because it is more difficult
for social influence and monitoring to operate through peer
relationships. The problem will be most pronounced in
large groups where significant interdependencies among
group members are absent. Peer pressure may then not be
sufficient to offset the dilution of incentives that naturally
occurs in group settings [37]. Next to diluted incentives,
from a purchaser perspective, a potential disadvantage of
directing P4P at groups is that groups generally have more
bargaining power than individuals and are more effective
in defying or negotiating the terms of external incentive
programs [77, 97]. Based on interviews with sponsors of
hospital P4P programs in the United States, Damberg et al.
[17] noted that in negotiating the terms of their P4P con-
tracts, sponsors experience greater bargaining power of
hospitals compared to individual physicians. Finally,
behavior may be hard to change in groups because of a
shared culture. However, group culture may also present an
advantage in that achieved performance improvements are
likely to be sustained as a result of peer pressure and
socialization of new members.
Individual and small-group incentives have an important
practical disadvantage. The success of a P4P program
depends on the reliability of the performance measures
used, which requires sufficiently large panels of patients
[64]. Especially when variation in performance attributable
to the physicians is small, which tends to be the case
particularly for outcome and resource use measures, large
numbers of patients per measure are needed to generate
reliable measurements [63]. Patient panels of individual
physicians and small groups are typically too small to
measure performance reliably [2, 54, 56, 63, 76, 90]. Thus,
if P4P targets individual physicians or small groups, mea-
sured performance is likely to reflect to a significant degree
random variation [13, 73], possibly resulting in misclassi-
fication of providers and incorrect allocation of incentive
payments [2, 76]. Constructing composite scores could
increase low reliability due to small sample size per mea-
sure [8] and has the additional advantage that it hampers
gaming behavior. However, it requires rich data and
complex calculations (e.g., for determining the relative
weights of individual measures) and considerations [80].
Also, composites provide less actionable information on
quality than individual measures and do not guarantee
reliability levels sufficient to enable inclusion of large
shares of providers [90]. Aggregating data across pur-
chasers may also be an option [50]. However, for several
reasons (e.g., possible violations of anti-trust regulation,
technical difficulties, patient confidentiality), this does not
occur on a large and systematic scale yet.
On balance, group incentives seem preferred over indi-
vidual incentives, mainly because performance profiles are
more likely to be reliable [56]. However, when perfor-
mance is compared across groups, it is important that there
are sufficient numbers of physicians in each comparison
group to detect meaningful differences. Nonadjustment for
clustering at the physician level (in addition to adjustment
for patient characteristics) could lead to overestimation of
the statistical significance of differences between groups
[44]. In addition, groups differ considerably in size and
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composition, and it is unclear how to treat the many pro-
viders working in small practices with small numbers of
patients for many measures [65, 73]. Although health care
is increasingly provided in group settings, small practice
settings will likely remain important, necessitating strate-
gies to facilitate inclusion of small practices [65]. As
methods for data aggregation and constructing composite
scores continue to evolve [50], it will be increasingly
possible to include measures with small sample size and to
target P4P at small groups. Of note, purchasers should be
cautious in applying hybrid structures (e.g., using both
group and individual incentives for a team with high
interdependence among team members) because they have
shown to perform worse than pure structures [97], perhaps
because they are less transparent and therefore less visible
to providers.
How to incentivize: how is the program structured?
Rewards versus penalties
Because individuals generally weigh losses more heavily
than gains, a larger behavioral response can be expected if
individuals perceive the incentive as a (possible) loss as
opposed to a (possible) gain [61]. This implies that with-
holds will be more effective in improving performance
than positive bonuses. For example, withholding $1,000
from base payments with the possibility of releasing this
amount in case performance targets are met will elicit a
stronger behavioral response than offering providers a
$1000 bonus for good performance [17]. However,
research has shown that incentive schemes incorporating
losses tend to be perceived as unfair and may result in
negative reactions among those incentivized [60]. Conse-
quently, the program may not be acceptable to providers,
and they may choose not to participate. This may espe-
cially be a problem if the bargaining power of the pur-
chaser (e.g., a health plan) is relatively low and if providers
can choose from among multiple plans to contract with [1].
But even if providers can be convinced or enforced to
participate, the behavioral response to financial penalties
may not necessarily be a desired response. The prospect of
a loss may cause physicians to behave opportunistically,
and incentives for gaming and other undesired behavior
may be large. (Importantly, not receiving a bonus from a
pool of money available for performance improvement
may also be perceived by providers as a financial penalty
because their relative income position deteriorates. Yet,
negative reactions will be stronger in case of absolute
financial penalties).
A possible way to still take advantage of the expected
strong provider response while limiting the possibility of
negative reactions is to combine rewards and penalties. For
example, providers could be offered a choice between a
$1,000 bonus for meeting targets and entering a deposit of
$500 with the prospect of a $2,000 bonus [71]. In case the
provider chooses the second option and fails to reach the
target, it loses the deposit. Thus, providers are offered a
choice between a possible increase in income without the
possibility of a loss in income and a larger possible
increase in income with the possibility of a loss in income.
Such a scheme also provides insight into differences
among providers in their expectations about their potential
for performance improvement. Furthermore, it will likely
be received positively by providers and increases the
likelihood of high participation rates. Table 1 displays the
characteristics of four possible schemes.
Despite the advantages of using rewards, purchasers
may opt for using ‘‘old’’ money (e.g., redistributing money
to high performers based on generically reduced base
payments). They could argue that programs using rewards
may not be sustainable and object to investing additional
resources in settings with substantial inefficiencies [13]. It
may be an option to use efficiency savings to finance the
program. However, performance improvement will, at least
in the short term, often be accompanied by cost increases
because a substantial share of quality problems is related to
undertreatment. Another option is to make use of inflation.
Providers could be given the prospect they will at least
receive their current absolute income in the next period
and, if they reach certain performance targets, they will
Table 1 Characteristics of schemes adopting penalties and/or rewards
Scheme Income increase or
decrease possible?
Incentive strength Likelihood of
negative reactions
1. Penalties for poor performance only Decrease only High High
2. Rewards for good performance only Increase only Moderate Low
3. Penalties for poor performance, (larger) rewards
for good performance
Both High Moderately high
4. Choice between 2 and 3 provided that
the potential increase in income is larger in 3 than in 2
Depends on choice Moderately high Moderately low
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also receive a mark-up based on the general increase in
price levels. In that case, the perceived decrease in income
for low performers is relatively small. However, negative
reactions cannot be ruled out. Thus, in case positive
incentives are not possible, the extent to which P4P will
improve overall performance depends on whether provid-
ers can be convinced or enforced to participate and whether
provider behavior can be effectively monitored and, if
necessary, countered. In practice, the use of negative
incentives in P4P programs has been declining rapidly. In
the United States, although withholds are still applied in
ten to twenty percent of current programs, more than 60
percent only use bonuses, mainly because of anticipated
negative reactions and the importance being attached to a
collaborative rather than a combative tone [4, 17, 93]. Also
in other countries, P4P programs typically only provide
positive incentives.
Incentive size
All else equal, the higher the revenue potential for pro-
viders, the larger their response and the impact on perfor-
mance, up to a certain point. Large incentives are salient
and increase the likelihood that the costs of performance
improvement, including the opportunity costs of not doing
something else, are covered [16, 47, 101]. These costs will
vary by the base payment system and the set of perfor-
mance measures, so the payment level sufficient to realize
improvements is not a static figure [12]. In general, the
relationship between incentive size and performance will
be positive with diminishing marginal increases in perfor-
mance above a certain payment level. This is because the
marginal utility of income generally diminishes and
because every unit of performance improvement will be
harder to attain than the previous unit. Also, there is evi-
dence that the reference- or target- income hypothesis is
applicable to physicians [81, 82], suggesting that when
physicians reach a certain income level, additional pay-
ment will not lead to further significant improvements.
Large payments, therefore, need not necessarily be more
effective than smaller payments. Although large payments
may still be necessary to persuade providers to participate,
compared with small payments they are more likely to
impair providers’ intrinsic motivation [18, 33]. Conse-
quently, the likelihood of undesired behavior increases
because positive net gains of this behavior are more likely.
Monitoring for this behavior may be costly and difficult, so
in determining incentive size purchasers will often be
confronted with a trade-off between an increased (but at a
certain point diminishing) impact on performance and
reduced intrinsic motivation. Yet, if payment levels are set
high enough, the positive effect on incentivized perfor-
mance may be greater than would be obtained through
intrinsic motivation alone [17]. This is illustrated by
Gneezy and Rustichini [40], who show empirically that in
financial incentive schemes one should pay enough or not
pay at all.’’ However, increasing incentive size to surpass
the loss in intrinsic motivation is of course an imperfect
solution that may not be sustainable and could lead to
problems like teaching to the test [55, 79]. Therefore, rel-
atively low-powered payments seem to be preferred, pro-
vided that they are based on performance measures that are
aligned with providers’ professional norms and values.
Empirical research on the influence of incentive size is
scarce. Hillman et al. [52, 53] suggest that the limited
success of the programs they evaluated may have been due
to the small bonus size, as well as short program duration
(less than 2 years) and lack of physician awareness. Con-
versely, Mullen et al. [75] found that a dramatic increase in
payment size triggered behavioral response. They investi-
gated whether movement in selected quality measures
changed when in addition to PacifiCare (a large network
HMO in California that had been running its own P4P
program called QIP), five other health plans in the Inte-
grated Healthcare Association (IHA) coalition adopted P4P
using a common measure set. Implementation of the IHA
program considerably increased the size of potential
bonuses for medical groups compared to what they could
potentially earn under QIP. The authors found that while
the QIP alone had not been able to generate improvements
in quality, after the other plans also adopted P4P some
quality measures did improve. Thus, the authors concluded
that payment size matters [75]. Finally, in the UK QOF,
which has been successful in improving performance in
primary care, performance payments can be up to 30 per-
cent of practice income [22]. However, it is unclear to what
extent observed improvements can be attributed to these
generous payments. In addition, as shown by McDonald
and Roland [68], the large financial incentives have likely
changed the nature of the office visit: ‘‘The requirement to
enter data into the electronic medical record to respond to
the large number of targets was described as reducing eye
contact, increasing time spent on data collection, and
potentially crowding out the patient’s agenda.’’
The opportunity costs of complying to P4P incentives
(i.e., the gains forgone of doing the next best alternative)
are determined largely by the base payment system [35].
Especially in fee-for-service, these costs can be substantial
because time and effort put in improving performance
cannot be used to treat patients and to perform tests.
Opportunity costs can be mitigated by replacing base
payments by performance-related payments. However,
multitasking predicts that important performance dimen-
sions will likely never be contractible so that mixed
payment is appointed [27]. Even if performance would
be entirely contractible, even on outcomes, the optimal
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compensation scheme would often still have a component
of income that is guaranteed because practice in health care
is inherently uncertain and physicians tend to be risk
averse [97]. Performance-related payments will therefore
be supplemental to base payments. In addition, it seems
warranted to ‘‘decouple’’ incentive payments from base
payment as much as possible [71]. Augmenting base pay-
ment from $1,000 to $1,100 will generally elicit a smaller
behavioral response than providing a separate $100 bonus
because individuals perceive the difference between $0 and
$100 as larger than the difference between $1,000 and
$1,100. Without decoupling, the incentive payment may be
perceived as negligible compared to the base payment and
the behavioral response may be small [95]. However,
decoupling adds to administrative complexity [71].
Absolute versus relative performance
Incentive payments can be based on absolute performance
(e.g., performing a foot examination for at least 90 percent
of eligible diabetics), relative performance (e.g., belonging
to the 10 percent of physicians with the highest rates of
performed foot exams), and improvement in performance
(e.g., large payments for large improvements with
improvement weighted more heavily at higher performance
levels than at lower levels). Absolute targets are transparent
and will be more acceptable to providers than relative
targets because they involve less uncertainty. However, in
a system in which the same P4P program is applied uni-
formly to a large group of providers, absolute targets may
not be very efficient because a substantial portion of bonus
payments may be awarded to providers already at or above
the targets. Furthermore, for improvement beyond targets
and improvement not reaching targets, providers receive
zero incremental payment [86]. The goal gradient
hypothesis predicts that a goal should be perceived
attainable by providers; otherwise, little response can be
expected [49]. Similarly, little effort can be expected after
the goal has been achieved. These difficulties can be solved
by differentiating required performance targets across
groups, depending on groups’ baseline performance (for
individual-level incentives, such an arrangement will
probably not be feasible because of high transaction costs).
For groups with low baseline performance, target and
payment could be set relatively low, whereas for high-
performing groups, target and payment could be set rela-
tively high.
Relative schemes stimulate continual improvement.
However, because they encourage competition, they may
reduce collaboration and dissemination of best practices
and may sustain performance gaps across providers [86].
Furthermore, the behavior of competing providers is to a
large extent beyond the individual provider’s control but
does influence that provider’s ranking. The strength of the
incentive may be limited because ‘‘type I errors (false
positive rewards based on relatively poor performance of
others) and type II errors (false negative penalties or
foregone rewards because of relatively good performance
of others)’’ are likely [16]. Moreover, compared with
absolute targets, relative targets involve more uncertainty
for providers regarding their possibilities and/or the efforts
needed to become eligible for payment. Because individ-
uals tend to be risk averse, P4P programs accompanying
little uncertainty will be more appealing to providers and
will therefore lead to higher participation rates than pro-
grams accompanying much uncertainty. Conversely, an
advantage of a relative scheme over an absolute scheme is
that the total amount of incentive payments can be calcu-
lated ex ante [86], which gives providers the prospect of
certain payment in case targets are reached. In an absolute
scheme, if more providers than expected reach the
threshold(s), either new money has to be generated or
payment per eligible provider has to be decreased. This is
exactly what happened in the QOF in the United Kingdom.
By 2006–2007 (the third year), primary care practices
scored on average more than 95 percent of the points
available, which exceeded the predictions of the Depart-
ment of Health, which had anticipated 75 percent attain-
ment [22]. While generating new money will be difficult,
reducing payments will probably lead to negative reactions
among providers and a reduced effect of the program in the
future [16]. If there is not much flexibility in increasing the
pool of incentive payments, the pool may be set to a
maximum about which participating providers should be
informed in advance.
Both relative and absolute schemes using single targets
risk being resisted by providers because they explicitly
create ‘‘winners’’ and ‘‘losers.’’ Because providers may
perceive losing as a penalty, a single target scheme may
provoke undesired behavior. As noted, this difficulty can be
solved by varying required (absolute) performance targets
across providers, conditional on baseline performance.
Another option is to confront all participating providers
with a series of (absolute) targets with large payments for
reaching high targets and low payments for reaching low
targets. Such a scheme also rewards improvement. The
downside of this approach is that the program may be
viewed as unfair and demotivating by high performers. In
that case, an option could be to choose a particular target as
a starting point (e.g., 50 percent) and to increase payments
as higher targets are reached. Providers with scores below
50 percent then get nothing or could be given a penalty.
Another option is to eliminate targets altogether and to use
a continuous gradient [71]. Yet, a scheme using targets
may be a stronger stimulus than a continuous scale because
providers have clear goals to work toward. Again, the QOF
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provides some (weak) empirical evidence. In the QOF,
each performance measure has a lower (e.g., 40 percent)
and an upper target (e.g., 90 percent). Between these tar-
gets, performance is measured on a continuous scale and
practices earn more points for reaching higher performance
levels. Improvements in the quality of care were most
pronounced for GPs with the lowest scores, narrowing
inequalities in quality of care, especially for chronic con-
ditions [21]. This may well have been a result of the use of
the continuous scale because even for the worst performers,
the lower targets were often attainable and for them,
improvements would entail large increases in income.
Alternatively, purchasers could opt for a system that
rewards high-value care, provided by anyone [86]. This can
be achieved by ‘‘paying all providers an additional fee for
each appropriately managed patient or for each recom-
mended service [so that] every provider has an incentive to
deliver the best care to each patient seen.’’ Drawbacks of
this approach (e.g., actuarial uncertainty for the purchaser)
have to be traded-off against its advantages (e.g., its sim-
plicity and certainty for providers, as well as less incentives
for risk selection compared to explicit targets). A recent
study by Chien et al. [11] showed that within a health plan
that implemented a ‘‘piece-rate’’ P4P program (i.e., pro-
viders received a payment for each patient meeting a per-
formance benchmark), childhood immunization rates
increased significantly more than among health plans that
did not. Also, the program did not exacerbate disparities nor
have a negative effect on children with chronic conditions.
In sum, differentiating required absolute performance
levels across providers and/or applying a series of tiered
absolute targets, possibly combined with additional fees for
each appropriately managed patient, are preferred over a
uniform, single threshold system and schemes using rela-
tive targets. Advantages of combining different approaches
in a single program should be weighted against increased
complexity and reduced incentive salience.
Frequency of payments
Providing a monthly $100 bonus with an additional pay-
ment of $500 based on overall improvement will be a more
effective lever of improvement than a single $1,700 bonus
at the end of the year. This is because people tend to dis-
count future gains by a certain rate, which increases with
the length of the delay [30]. In addition, people generally
discount losses at lower rates than gains and large out-
comes more than small outcomes [30, 96]. Thus, mini-
mizing the time lag between care delivery and payment is
warranted, especially when large payments are used, also
because the costs of improving performance are often
incurred without much delay. A high frequency becomes
even more important in case providers experience
uncertainty regarding the net gains of improvement efforts
(as in relative schemes) because, compared to schemes
involving little uncertainty, possible gains will be dis-
counted at higher rates. A second reason why a high pay-
ment frequency is important is that in risk-averse people,
each additional unit of income leads to a smaller increase
in utility than the previous unit. A large lump-sum payment
will likely be less effective than a series of smaller, more
frequent payments because each payment is judged as a
new gain rather than an addition to the previous gain [17,
95]. Finally, a high payment frequency increases incentive
salience. In practice, however, data collection and valida-
tion may considerably delay payments, and long perfor-
mance periods may be necessary to yield sufficient
reliability. In a randomized experiment, Chung et al. [14]
investigated whether the impact of P4P is larger when
payments are provided quarterly as opposed to annually.
They found no difference between the two trial arms in
average quality score or in total bonus amount earned.
However, physicians also received quarterly performance
feedback, and the authors were unable to disentangle the
effects of quarterly P4P and quarterly feedback. Also,
regardless of the payment frequency, the size of the
incentives may have been too small to elicit a noticeable
impact on performance (bonuses were potentially 2.5 per-
cent of the average physician’s annual income), although
this was not specially examined.
Clearly, for performance on outcomes that occur in the
long term, a high payment frequency is not possible. In that
case, P4P programs will have to resort to structural and
process measures, as well as to more generic measures like
patient experience, which can be measured on a more
regular basis. At least in theory, for these measures, a high
payment frequency contributes to incentive strength. This
does not imply that P4P can be used only for short-term
objectives. For example, in long-term contracts with hos-
pitals, payment could be linked to 5-year mortality for
different conditions. However, for specific types of care
(e.g., rehabilitation and preventive care), P4P will not often
be linked to clinical outcomes because they occur too far in
the future. Instead, other types of outcomes may be
included such as patient-reported outcomes or, regarding
rehabilitation, patients’ general abilities to independently
perform activities of daily living.
Program duration
As noted by Town and colleagues, expectations about the
future stability of new incentive schemes may influence
whether providers will be responsive to these schemes. The
decision to invest in performance improvement (e.g.,
adopting an expensive IT infrastructure) requires making
projections about future payment rates and expectations
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about return on investment [97]. Thus, the duration of the
program as well as providers’ expectations hereof seem
important predictors of its effectiveness. Programs that are
perceived as a stable systemic change will probably be
more effective than programs that are perceived as a
temporary effort. In addition, the effects of external
rewards tend to last only through the period of incentive
delivery; as soon as the scheme is abolished, performance
may revert to the baseline level [16, 18]. P4P aims to
counterbalance perverse incentives in the base payment
system (e.g., the incentive to do more than necessary in a
fee-for-service system), so abolishing P4P incentives
would mean that providers are confronted again only with
the incentives emanating from the base payments. There-
fore, once implemented, performance-related payment
should ideally remain a permanent component of provid-
ers’ compensation. However, it is questionable whether
programs using solely new money (generated through
efficiency savings or otherwise) are sustainable in the long
run.
The frequency of turnover of performance measures,
i.e., the duration of incentivizing specific aspects of per-
formance within the program, is also of relevance [102]. A
high frequency can be demoralizing for providers, espe-
cially if measures in which substantial effort has been put
are replaced as soon as targets are reached. Yet, periodic
reevaluation of measures will be essential, also from an
efficiency viewpoint; it may not make sense to continue
using measures in which performance has reached a pla-
teau. In that case, replacing and/or updating measures are
warranted, also because variation in performance may have
become too small to measure performance reliably and to
discriminate across providers [63, 90].
Discussion
This paper provides an overview of key issues in the design
of P4P programs by synthesizing theoretical and empirical
literature. The design of P4P programs is important since it
determines the way in which the behavior of providers is
influenced. To prevent undesired behavior, careful con-
sideration of how the incentives are framed is vital, espe-
cially in multitasking environments [55]. Although the idea
underlying P4P is simple, this paper has shown that
designing a fair and effective P4P program is a complex
undertaking requiring consideration of many interrelated
aspects and potential pitfalls. Nonetheless, several tentative
conclusions can be made, which are summarized in
Table 2.
However, conclusions on appropriate program design
are inherently context-dependent. Judgment about whether
a particular P4P program is designed appropriately will
vary according to the setting in which it was implemented.
For example, when providers are capitated, payment can be
relatively small because, all else equal, the opportunity
costs of improving performance are low compared to when
providers are paid through fee-for-service. Next to the base
payment system, other relevant contextual factors are the
characteristics of the practice environment (e.g., the level
of information technology); whether P4P is implemented in
a single-purchaser healthcare system or in a system with
Table 2 Conclusions with respect to P4P-program design
What to incentivize
Performance is ideally defined broadly, provided that the set of
measures remains comprehensible
Concerns that P4P encourages ‘‘risk selection’’ and ‘‘teaching to
the test’’ should not be dismissed
Outcome and resource use measures should be included provided
that risk adjustment is sophisticated and sample size is sufficient.
Other strategies to minimize incentives for risk selection may
still be necessary
Measure sets should at least incorporate ‘‘high-impact’’ measures;
the more indeterminate aspects of care such as patient
satisfaction and continuity of care are ideally also included or
monitored
P4P incentives should be aligned with professional norms and
values; it is vital that providers are actively involved in program
design and in the selection of performance measures
Monitoring, structured feedback, and sophisticated information
technology will remain important in preventing undesired
provider behavior
Whom to incentivize
On balance, group incentives are preferred over individual
incentives, mainly because performance profiles are then more
likely to be reliable
Individual or small-group incentives as well as using measures
with small sample size will become increasingly feasible as
methods for constructing composite scores evolve
Caution should be upheld in applying hybrid schemes
Participation is ideally voluntary provided that broad participation
among eligible providers can be realized
How to incentivize
Whether rewards or penalties should be used is context-dependent.
Offering providers a choice among schemes also including
penalties may be considered
Increasing the size of the incentive increases their strength up to a
certain point. Yet, relatively low-powered payments are
preferred, provided that providers’ costs of improving
performance are covered
Differentiated absolute targets across groups and/or a tiered series
of absolute targets, possibly combined with additional ‘‘piece-
rates’’ for each appropriately managed patient, are preferred over
single targets and schemes using relative targets
The time lag between care delivery and payment should be
minimized
P4P should be a permanent component of compensation and is
ideally decoupled from base payments. Measures should be
reevaluated periodically and be replaced or updated as necessary
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multiple (competing) purchasers and, in case of the latter,
the extent to which there is overlap in provider networks
(much overlap may result in conflicting incentives for
individual providers and increased complexity in provider
decision making); whether P4P is implemented in a system
in which financing and delivery of care are integrated (such
as HMO-like entities in the United States, Israel, and
Switzerland) or in a system with a purchaser/provider split
(in an integrated system, P4P would be enacted by the
organization’s management, which likely have more pos-
sibilities to directly influence providers’ behavior and align
providers’ incentives than purchasers that operate more or
less independently from providers); whether providers have
fixed patient panels (if not, computerized algorithms are
necessary to attribute care to involved providers and it will
be more difficult to generate reliable performance profiles);
whether there are concurrent improvement efforts (e.g.,
public reporting) targeting the same or different perfor-
mance aspects; and the legal environment (e.g., data
aggregation across competing purchasers may be in vio-
lation with anti-trust regulation). Recently, research has
begun to address the influence of specific contextual factors
(e.g., [69, 98]. As shown in this work, this influence is
likely to be substantial.
Several difficulties mitigate the strength of our conclu-
sions. First, given a particular context, appropriate design
choices may conflict. For example, group incentives and a
broad measure set including outcome measures will often
be preferred over individual incentives and measure sets
not incorporating outcomes. However, as this paper has
shown it is important to minimize provider uncertainty. For
the individual provider, uncertainty regarding the net gains
of improvement efforts increases when the incentive is
targeted at the group level and when perceived possibilities
for performance improvement decrease as a result of add-
ing outcome measures to the measure set. Similarly, this
paper has argued that using a tiered series of absolute
targets is preferred over using a single target. However,
such a scheme also adds to complexity, which may dilute
incentive strength since individuals typically have diffi-
culties in processing complex decisions tied to financial
incentives [71]. Second, practical difficulties may impede
appropriate design. For example, where individual incen-
tives are preferred, small sample sizes may necessitate
targeting groups or aggregating scores. Similarly, although
minimizing the time lag between care delivery and receipt
of payments is warranted, data collection and validation are
often time consuming and could result in payment coming
long after the period of care delivery. Third, empirical
evidence regarding the influence of specific design choices
in practice is scarce. As a result, the weight of different
design choices in terms of incentive strength is largely
unknown. In particular, several authors have called for
more research investigating specifically the ‘‘dose–
response’’ relationship in P4P [13, 35, 72, 78, 87]. Until
further empirical research on these specific topics becomes
available, lessons will have to be drawn from applications
of P4P in practice. However, although evaluation studies
may provide valuable information, without explicitly
examining design issues, it will be difficult to isolate the
influence of specific design choices on P4P performance. In
addition, as noted by Petersen et al. [78] and Frølich et al.
[35], details on program design are generally not well
documented, which mitigates the relevance of such studies
for these purposes even more. Finally, there are important
limitations in the interpretation of the theories applied in
this paper for predicting provider behavior. For example,
the theories predominantly describe the behavior of indi-
viduals, not groups of individuals or organizations (like
hospitals). The impact of P4P-program design on provider
behavior may be different when groups or organizations
are regarded [17].
Conclusion
Designing a fair and effective P4P program is a complex
undertaking. This complexity and the limited effectiveness
thus far cast serious doubt on whether P4P can be cost
effective. In addition to the performance payments them-
selves, data collection and validation as well as payment
calculation likely involve significant transaction costs.
Therefore, adequate evaluations of P4P programs would not
only assess the impact on quality but also include com-
prehensive cost analyses. However, a recent review iden-
tified only nine economic evaluations of P4P programs and
concluded that current evidence is insufficient to support
P4P cost-effectiveness [28]. Nonetheless, P4P may be able
to mitigate cost growth through better prevention and dis-
ease management and through inclusion of efficiency
measures. Recently, purchasers have begun to incorporate
efficiency measures in their P4P programs [57, 83]. Yet,
empirical research investigating the influence of specific
design choices and contextual factors is needed to enable
fine tuning of P4P programs tailored to the setting of
implementation. In the meantime, it would be sensible if
purchasers would (continue to) consider other improvement
strategies in their efforts to achieve more value for money.
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